Thursday, 21 October 2010
CASE 118 - Agile Enterprise Architecture
Agile Enterprise Architecture: Creating patsies for every type of false flag-nuclear-bio-cyber
Creating false flag - nuclear situations with agile software methodology enterprise architectures have preemptivley created patsies way ahead of time to serve as the cover for a full range of false flag terror attacks that the elite has at their disposal, to be used selectively at their discretion, based on what Agile (i.e. CAESAR) tells them has the highest probability of stupefying the sheep public into buying as the most likely believable propaganda. Its got a whole database with many scenarios
1st we have the circumstances all set to go for the false flag bioterror patsy angle:
Hunting Dangerous Genes
The building blocks for deadly bio-weapons are available by email or online to almost anyone who cares to place an order—and the world has begun to pay attention. "Current government oversight of the DNA-synthesis industry falls short of addressing this unfortunate reality," wrote a group of academics, industry executives, and security experts in a 2007 article, "DNA Synthesis and Biological Security," which appeared in the journal Nature Biotechnology.
Addressing that scary scenario head-on is a group of MITRE experimental and computational biologists developing a method for weeding out dangerous synthetic DNA orders from harmless ones. They call their fledgling process DOTS, short for DNA Order Tracking System. And with the success of an early prototype, they now have set their sights on making DOTS available outside of the laboratory.
Some background: Genetic materials made to order from the basic chemical components of DNA are now routinely manufactured by dozens of companies in the United States and abroad. Anyone can place an email order with these DNA synthesis companies for any combination of genetic base pairs A, T, G, and C and have the order delivered. (Please see "The ABCs of ATGC," on this page.) It's also cheap: costs for DNA synthesis have fallen from $30 per base pair in 1990 to roughly 55 cents per base pair today.
So far, one factor limiting easy abuse of factory-made genetic materials is that no manufacturer has yet been able to make a DNA sequence longer than 35,000 base pairs. Because a virus like Variola major, which causes smallpox, contains 190,000 base pairs of DNA, some feel comfortable that would-be bioterrorists can't readily order such dangerous pathogens.